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The principle of the presumption of innocence is recognised in most legal systems all over the world. That principle 
requires that public statements and official decisions from public authorities do not refer to the suspects or accused 
persons as if they were convicts before the final judgement. The trial detention restricts the rights and freedom in most 
degree. For this reason, it is important to develop such principles for the enforcement of pre-trial detention that the 
freedom of the individual detained as part of criminal proceedings be limited to the minimum before the final and binding 
sentence. The objective of this article is not only to present the normative shape of the enforcement of pre-trial detention 
in the light of Polish regulations and compile a catalogue of limitations resulting from the application of this measure, but 
also to compare the actual situation of a person placed under pre-trial detention to that of a person serving the penalty of 
deprivation of liberty. 
 




The execution of the functions of criminal law requires 
that its procedures are adopted in such a way as to ensure 
the quick and efficient conduct of criminal proceedings. 
The most severe preventive measure implemented to 
ensure the proper handling of criminal procedure is pre-
trial detention. This institution is present in virtually all 
legal systems, and its application has a long history dating 
as far back as ancient Athens Izydorczyk [1]. It is worth 
mentioning that the difficulty involved in this matter and 
the controversy surrounding it arise from the fact that it 
is imposed on a person who has not been duly sentenced 
and who is presumed innocent until his guilt has been 
proven [2]. Therefore, it is important to establish such 
principles for the enforcement of pre-trial detention that 
the freedom of a person detained as part of the criminal 
proceedings be limited only to a minimal necessary extent 
before the final and binding sentence is given Szumski [3]. 
 
The objective of this article is to present the normative 
shape of the enforcement of pre-trial detention in the light 
of Polish regulations and compile a catalogue of 
limitations resulting from the application of this measure, 
as well as to compare the actual situation of a person in 
pre-trial detention to that of a person serving a sentence 
of deprivation of liberty. The problem is not trivial, 
because it concerns fundamental human rights. In 
addition, the scale of the phenomenon is not insignificant: 
in 2018, there was an average of 74 077 prisoners in 
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Polish prisons and detention centres, including 7 428 
detainees (http://www.sw.gov.pl/strona/statystyka-
roczna). Moreover, in Poland there is a systematic 
problem with the excessive length of pre-trial detention. 
Cases in which detention lasts over two years are not 
isolated (http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/HFHR_PTD_2015_EN.pdf). It 
should be emphasized that the problem of pre-trial 
detention is not local and it is not limited to polish 
regulations. The institution of detention is known by all 
legal systems, and the detainees’ rights are a global 
problem. 
 
In general, the enforcement of the penalty of 
deprivation of liberty appears to share a number of 
similarities with pre-trial detention. More specifically: 1) 
both the custodial sentence and pre-trial detention are 
applied in the course of criminal procedure, and not 
outside of it; 2) both measures involve isolating 
individuals from the rest of society; 3) both are applied 
for a specified period of time; 4) both entail the same legal 
effects in the case of evidently wrongful application 
thereof; 5) both can be applied only following a formal 
decision of a judicial body (court) by way of order or 
ruling [4]. Nonetheless, problems arise in the case of more 
detailed regulations on this matter.  
 
As the starting point for a discussion on this issue, let 
us analyse the wording of Article 214 of the Polish Law on 
the Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions, pursuant to which 
a person being held in pre-trial detention shall enjoy at 
least the same rights as a convicted person serving a 
sentence of deprivation of liberty. The literature on the 
subject indicates that the status of a person sentenced to 
deprivation of liberty is significantly different from that of 
a person placed in pre-trial detention, given that the 
principle of the presumption of innocence excludes the 
possibility of burdening a person subject to pre-trial 
detention with obligations and precludes the application 
of numerous restrictions irreconcilable with the 
objectives of pre-trial detention [5]. It should therefore be 
noted that the wording of Article 214 of the Law on 
Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions (and in particular the 
phrase "at least"), as well as the repeated opinions on it, 
may suggest that the status of a person being held in pre-
trial detention is better than that of a person serving a 
sentence of deprivation of liberty. In the Polish literature, 
nonetheless, arguments have been advanced that 
detention entails a situation – both legally and factually – 
similar to that created by the penalty of deprivation of 
liberty [6]. 
The Essence and Purpose of the Pre-Trial 
Detention 
It is clear that pre-trial detention constitutes 
derogation from the constitutional guarantee of personal 
liberty – Article 41 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland. Given that the limitations of the rights of 
detainees arise from the objectives of the preventive 
measure taking the form of pre-trial detention, it seems 
necessary first of all to analyse these objectives. Article 
207 of the Law on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions 
provides that the execution of pre-trial detention is 
intended to achieve the objectives for which the measure 
was applied, and in particular, to safeguard the proper 
course of the criminal proceedings. In this context, Tęcza-
Paciorek A [7] lists, following the Polish literature on the 
subject, three types of safeguards: safeguarding the 
accused person for the purpose of the proceedings as a 
source of evidence and as an active party to the trial, 
safeguarding the accused person for the potential 
enforcement proceedings, in particular when the 
imposition of a penalty of deprivation of liberty is 
expected, and safeguarding criminal proceedings against 
obstruction of justice on the part of the accused. 
 
In view of the doubts as to what the objectives of pre-
trial detention are in the context of Article 207 of the Law 
on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions, we should refer to 
the objectives and functions of this measure as specified 
in the literature (in particular in the literature on criminal 
procedure). It is difficult to deny that the postulative and 
actual functions of pre-trial detention must be identified 
based on the regulations which provide for the 
application of this measure, and more specifically, on the 
statutory conditions for optional pre-trial detention. They 
are laid down in Article 249 § 1, which provides that: 
§ 1. Preventive measures may be applied in order to 
secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, and 
exceptionally, to prevent a new serious offence from 
being committed by the accused. They may be applied 
only if the evidence collected indicates a high probability 
that he has committed an offence. 
and Article 258, worded as follows: 
§ 1. Pre-trial detention and other preventive measures 
may be applied if: 
1) there is good reason to fear that the accused may take 
flight or go into hiding, particularly if he has no 
permanent residence in this country or when his identity 
cannot be established;  
2) There is good reason to fear that the accused would 
induce other persons to give false testimony or attempt to 
obstruct the criminal proceedings in some other manner. 
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§ 2. If the accused has been charged with a crime or with a 
misdemeanour carrying the statutory maximum penalty 
of deprivation of liberty of a minimum of 8 years, or if the 
court of the first instance sentenced him to a penalty of 
deprivation of liberty of no less than 3 years, the need to 
apply the pre-trial detention in order to secure the proper 
conduct of proceedings may be justified by the severe 
penalty threatening the accused.  
§ 3. Pre-trial detention may also be applied, in exceptional 
cases, when there is good reason to fear that the accused 
charged with a crime or an intentional misdemeanour 
would commit an offence against life, health or public 
safety, particularly if he threatened to commit such an 
offence. 
 
The aforementioned conditions, in particular the last 
two set out in Article 258 § 2 and 3, came under 
considerable criticism in the Polish literature [8-10]. 
Tylman J [11] argues that in almost all countries pre-trial 
detention goes beyond the primary objective of securing 
the proper conduct of the proceedings – to a greater or 
lesser degree, this measure serves to fulfil other tasks of 
an extraprocedural nature [4].  
It is essential that the difference between the 
objectives of the penalty of deprivation of liberty and pre-
trial detention should be known. It is made clear in the 
Prison Service Act, pursuant to which the main tasks of 
the Prison Service include, among others: 
1. Provision of correctional treatment and social 
reintegration measures for persons sentenced to the 
penalty of deprivation of liberty, in particular through 
organisation of work conducive to the acquisition of 
professional qualifications, as well as provision of 
schooling, cultural activities, sport activities, and 
specialist therapeutic measures, and 
2. Enforcement of pre-trial detention in a manner which 
secures the proper conduct of criminal proceedings for 
an offense or fiscal offence. With a view to the 
application of the principle of the presumption of 
innocence and the duration of detention, Teodor 
Szymanowski's [12] opinion that pre-trial detention 
fails to achieve any penitentiary objectives is hardly 
surprising. The question arises as to whether the 
resignation from the preventive objective in the case of 
pre-trial detention aggravates the situation of the 
detainee, e.g. by significantly reduced opportunities for 
participation in various forms of correctional treatment 
such as cultural and educational activities [13]. It is 
unacceptable that by reason of the legal situation of a 
person being held in pre-trial detention and the 
application of the principle of the presumption of 
innocence, a detainee is deprived of certain rights on 
the sole ground that they are attributed a certain 
function (e.g. correctional). 
 
Rights of Persons Placed in Pre-Trial 
Detention and Persons Serving a Sentence 
of Deprivation of Liberty 
Pursuant to Article 214 of the Law on Enforcement of 
Criminal Sanctions which defines the minimum rights and 
obligations of persons placed in pre-trial detention, a 
prisoner on remand shall enjoy at least the same rights as 
those granted to a person serving a sentence of 
deprivation of liberty under the ordinary regime in a 
closed correctional facility. This clearly shows that of all 
the types of correctional facilities and the different rigor 
that they entail, the legislator chose the most rigorous 
one. The question remains open whether that decision 
was sensible and well thought-out. Clearly, certain 
restrictions resulting from incarceration in a closed 
correctional facility must be imposed on prisoners on 
remand – for instance excluding the possibility of leaving 
the cell on one's own, due to concerns about establishing 
illegal communication with other detainees. Nonetheless, 
some of the privileges reserved for inmates in semi-open 
or open correctional facilities, such as an increased 
number of family visits, could and should also be 
accorded to persons being held in pre-trial detention. It is 
worth recalling that detaining a person without a valid 
sentence ought to entail granting of special rights, given 
that the person in question is not a convict, restriction of 
whose rights may even seem somewhat justified 
depending on the gravity of the offence committed. 
Moreover, convicted prisoners can usually "earn" a 
transfer to another correctional facility with less rigorous 
supervision for maintaining good behaviour while 
imprisoned, but this opportunity does not exist for 
prisoners on remand. Given the above, it would be 
appropriate to establish a separate type of facility, 
account being taken of the special status of persons 
placed in pre-trial detention, introducing all the necessary 
restrictions, in particular with respect to communication, 
but simultaneously granting detainees the widest possible 
additional privileges, in view of the fact that detention is 
applied without a valid convicting judgment. These rights 
could apply to both the cultural and educational sphere 
(additional classes or courses), as well as the social area 
(better quality food, additional showers or walks), or 
correctional measures, as the prolonged pre-trial 
detention that is often applied deprives a considerable 
proportion of detainees of the possibility to engage in 
social reintegration and health care activities available to 
a person serving a sentence of deprivation of liberty. This 
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may limit or prevent the achievement of the objectives of 
the penalty of deprivation of liberty, although the period 
of pre-trial detention will count towards the enforcement 
of the penalty of deprivation of liberty, thus reducing its 
duration, sometimes so much that the penalty will be 
considered to have been served in full.  
 
A sample list of the rights granted to persons deprived 
of liberty is laid down in Article 102 of the Law on 
Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions. Although these rights 
are vested in each person, depriving anyone of liberty as a 
result of a decision by the state requires that it is 
explicitly articulated.  
 
The rights of persons subject to pre-trial detention are 
not listed separately in the Law on Enforcement of 
Criminal Sanctions, which does not imply that the 
legislator completely failed to address this issue. The 
aforementioned Article 214 of the Law on Enforcement of 
Criminal Sanctions provides that detainees shall enjoy at 
least the same rights as those granted to persons serving 
a sentence of deprivation of liberty under the ordinary 
regime in a closed correctional facility. Restrictions in this 
respect, if any, are only justified if driven by the need to 
secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings, 
maintain order and security in the detention facility and 
prevent demoralisation. The question arises, though, 
whether in view of the fact that persons placed in pre-trial 
detention benefit from the presumption of innocence, 
these restrictions are legitimate.  
 
Starting from the minimum space of 3 square metres 
for each detainee, as guaranteed under Polish law, it 
should be noted that while overpopulation in Polish 
penitentiary facilities has steadily decreased over the past 
few years, there are no statistics available as to the 
overpopulation among prisoners on remand. While it 
would be reasonable to increase the space per one 
prisoner in all groups of detainees, it is hugely important 
to do so with respect to prisoners on remand. First of all, 
prisoners on remand spend almost all day in their cells, 
and secondly, the principle of presumption of innocence 
precludes unnecessary burdening of persons being held in 
pre-trial detention with hardships incompatible with the 
objectives to be achieved by the imposition of the most 
severe preventive measure [14], which in this case have 
no relevance to the standards of detention determined 
e.g. by the size of the cell. Therefore, consideration should 
be given to the introduction of a separate, different 
minimum space for those subject to pre-trial detention 
and those serving a sentence of deprivation of liberty. It is 
worth stressing that some countries distinguish between 
different cell spaces depending on particular types of 
detainees [15]. 
 
What distinguishes the rights of persons placed in pre-
trial detention from those of convicted prisoners is that 
the former are not allowed to possess communication 
devices, technical devices used for recording and playing 
back information, computers, but also, out of deposit, 
items and documents which may hinder the proper 
course of criminal proceedings (Article 216 § 1 of the Law 
on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions). Whereas some of 
these restrictions are entirely understandable, a stringent 
ban on computers, even without an Internet connection, 
must be surprising, given that convicted prisoners are 
allowed to possess such equipment upon meeting certain 
conditions, and it is difficult to perceive the computer as a 
threat to the achievement of the objectives of the 
preventive measure.  
 
The rights of persons subject to pre-trial detention are 
also at risk as regards the contacts of detainees with the 
external world, in particular prison visits. Prisoners on 
remand have the right to be visited at least once per 
month by a member of their inner circle, provided that 
the authority the detainee remains at the disposal of 
expresses consent. Consent may be refused when there is 
a justified concern that the visit will be used to cause an 
illicit impediment to the conduct of criminal proceedings 
or commit an offence, in particular to instigate an offence. 
Thus, although the Law on Enforcement of Criminal 
Sanctions grants a person being held in pre-trial 
detention the right to see a person from his inner circle at 
least once a month, this right is not granted on a 
mandatory basis, as its exercise is contingent upon the 
consent of the authority at whose disposal the detainee 
remains, and the authority is under no obligation to give 
such consent [14]. 
 
The Commissioner for Human Rights several years ago 
drew attention to illegitimate refusals and extremely long 
periods without contact with the inner circle (up to 20 
months) [16]. This regulation must raise serious doubts. 
There are no legitimate reasons to prevent persons placed 
in pre-trial detention from having prison visits in the 
number provided for open correctional facilities. In 
situations where the offence committed has no link with 
the family of the detainee, his meeting with his family will 
not exert any impact on the course of the criminal 
proceedings. 
 
Furthermore, persons being held in pre-trial detention 
who have permanent custody of children less than 15 
years of age have no right to additional visits from the 
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children, whereas convicted prisoners may exercise this 
right. In addition, regulations concerning the course of 
such visits also appear illegitimate – persons placed in 
pre-trial detention may consume food and beverages 
purchased by visitors in the detention facility only when 
the visit is organised in such a way that direct contact 
between the detainee and the visitor is possible (Article 
217 § 4 of the Law on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions). 
This restriction does not seem rational, as otherwise 
these products could be handed over to the detainee by a 
Prison Service officer. On the whole, it should be noted 
that the regulations concerning visits between a prisoner 
on remand and his inner circle must be considered 
insufficient; the legislator should above all take into 
consideration their situation – the fact that they are 
detained without a valid sentence and are often placed in 
facilities located far from their place of residence.  
 
The status of individuals subject to pre-trial detention 
is also influenced by the scope of the right to contacts 
with ministers providing religious services. Convicted 
prisoners have access to religious services, can directly 
participate in church services on religious holidays, listen 
to services transmitted by mass media, participate in 
religious education classes held in the correctional 
facility, and have the right to individual meetings with a 
minister. On the other hand, the body at whose disposal a 
person being held in pre-trial detention is may restrict or 
otherwise determine how the prisoner on remand may 
exercise the right to have contact with e.g. ministers, 
where it is essential for ensuring the proper conduct of 
criminal proceedings. However, the relevant issue in this 
case is not restricting individual contacts with a priest, 
but the possibility of staying in places of collective 
worship, which results in contacts with other detainees. 
Although the literature on the subject has questioned the 
possibility to restrict a prisoner on remand's participation 
in a church service [17], this is permitted by article 217 § 
6 of the Law on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions, as 
confirmed by the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights in case Janusz Kawiecki v. Poland (23 
October 2012, no. 15593/07). In this respect, it should be 
emphasised that even if the authority at whose disposal 
the detainee remains deems it necessary to restrict or 
otherwise determine a detainee's contact with a minister, 
it is not possible to completely block a detainee’s contacts 
with clergymen. 
 
Contacts of prisoners on remand with the external 
world are also restricted in terms of free correspondence. 
Detailed rules on seizing, censorship and supervision over 
the correspondence of prisoners on remand are laid down 
in Article 217 a and b of the Law on Enforcement of 
Criminal Sanctions. Although the Act only mentions 
selective supervision over the correspondence of a 
prisoner on remand by prison authorities, the executive 
regulation clearly indicates that in the event where the 
authority at whose disposal the prisoner remains decides 
against censoring his correspondence, section 4 providing 
for censorship of such correspondence must apply 
accordingly (§ 118 (4) and (5) of the regulation of the 
Minister of Justice of 23 June 2015 on administrative 
activities related to the enforcement of pre-trial 
detention, penalties, and coercive measures resulting in 
deprivation of liberty and documentation of these 
activities). Thus, despite the decision by the authority at 
whose disposal the detainee remains against 
correspondence censorship, the correspondence is still 
checked by Prison Service officers. Such a restriction of 
the rights of prisoners on remand seems to be pointless, 
as it does not by any means reflect the need to secure the 
proper conduct of criminal proceedings. Moreover, it was 
introduced by way of regulation and not in the act, and so 
it must be evaluated negatively [18]. 
 
Another problem concerns the functioning of the 
normative layer in practice – the Commissioner for 
Human Rights has pointed out the significant delays in the 
delivery of correspondence, which can last anything from 
two weeks to several months [16]. This practice causes 
unnecessary hardship for prisoners on remand; in 
particular, that correspondence is truly their only form of 
contact with their inner circle [19]. 
 
An important element of communication of detainees 
with the external world is telephone communication. 
Persons placed in pre-trial detention cannot use 
connectivity products other than the telephone. Making 
telephone conversations is conditional upon gaining 
consent of the authority at whose disposal the prisoner on 
remand remains, and the authority in question may refuse 
the consent if, in their opinion, there is legitimate concern 
that the conversation will be used to cause an illicit 
impediment to the conduct of criminal proceedings or 
commit an offence, and in particular to instigate an 
offence. It is worth considering whether the introduction 
of a stringent ban on connectivity products other than the 
telephone was legitimate. Supervised conversations, e.g. 
via Skype, make it easier to contact relatives, which can be 
particularly important in case of conversations with small 
children. Moreover, email correspondence is faster than 
traditional mail correspondence with e.g. family members 
having atypical working hours or living abroad.  
 
The rights of prisoners on remand are also restricted 
as regards using prison furloughs. Pursuant to Article 
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217d of the Law on Enforcement of Criminal Actions, 
granting a person placed in pre-trial detention a furlough 
under Article 141a § 1 of the Law on Enforcement of 
Criminal Sanctions is subject to consent from the 
disposing authority. This automatically extends the 
waiting period for a decision on temporary leave permit 
to be absent from prison, which is important insofar as 
most situations that justify a positive decision in this 
respect are of an urgent nature and are predetermined in 
time, as is the case e.g. with funerals of the closest 
relatives. By way of example, it should be noted that in the 
year 2012 convicted prisoners were granted 6,392 leave 
permits under Article 141a § 1 of the Law on Enforcement 
of Criminal Sanctions, whereas prisoners on remand 
merely 22 [5]. 
 
Another matter that should be mentioned is the 
possibility to undertake work while being detained. 
Whereas convicted prisoners may be required to carry 
out work without their consent, this does not apply to 
prisoners on remand (except for cleaning tasks on prison 
premises). Nevertheless, the latter are far less likely to 
find employment while remaining in detention. Suffice it 
to say that in 2018, out of 7 428 persons being held in 
pre-trial detention, only 16 (!) had a paying job in the 
detention centre or outside 
(http://www.sw.gov.pl/strona/statystyka-roczna). The 
low employment rate is closely related to the fact that 
employment outside of the detention centre is subject to 
consent from the authority at whose disposal the prisoner 
on remand remains (Article 218 § 1 of the Law on 
Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions), which automatically 
translates into a smaller chance of finding work with 
external entities cooperating with penitentiary facilities.  
 
The rights of prisoners on remand are also different 
from those of convicted prisoners in terms of the available 
awards to be granted to them by the prison 
administration. Whereas the catalogue of awards for 
prisoners on remand includes awards which are not 
available to convicted prisoners, such as consent to 
individual decoration of the cell, additional or longer 
walks, or consent to receiving a parcel exceeding the 
weight allowance, convicted prisoners may receive a 
number of awards not available to persons being held in 
pre-trial detention, including unsupervised visits, 
unsupervised visits in a separate room, unsupervised 
visits to a closest relative or person from the inner circle 
outside the correctional facility, for a period of time no 
longer than 30 hours at a time, or leave permit to be 
absent from prison without supervision for a period of 
time no longer than 14 days at a time. This comparison 
leads to two conclusions. First of all, some of the 
differences in the awards available to convicted prisoners 
and those available to prisoners on remand lack any 
justification and can by no means be justified by the 
achievement of the objectives of the preventive measure. 
Based on the objectives of pre-trial detention, it cannot be 
explained why the awards available only to persons 
placed in pre-trial detention are not available to convicted 
prisoners, and vice versa, why persons to whom this most 
severe preventive measure was applied cannot be given 
an award or consent to pass a gift to a person of their 
choice. Secondly, the catalogue of awards available only to 
convicted prisoners has been unnecessarily narrowed 
down as regards prisoners on remand with respect to 
consent to additional visits, unsupervised visits, and 
unsupervised visits in a separate room. In the event 
where the authority at whose disposal the prisoner on 
remand is consents to such awards, it is hard to explain 
adequately how they might impede the achievement of 
the objectives of the applied preventive measures, if the 
persons to be involved in such visits are not relevant to 
the ongoing criminal proceedings.  
 
While conducting a comparison of the rights of 
convicted prisoners and prisoners on remand, one must 
not overlook the fact that such a division of detainees is 
not of a dichotomous nature. Cases where convicted 
prisoners serving a sentence of deprivation of liberty in 
other penal cases are subject to a preventive measure in 
the form of pre-trial detention are not unheard of. This 
situation is foreseen in Article 223a of the Law on 
Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions. In § 1 it provides that 
such persons shall enjoy the same rights as convicted 
prisoners, with the exception of: visits, correspondence, 
the use of the telephone and other wired and wireless 
connectivity products, keeping things in the cell, receipt of 
healthcare services. In addition, there are distinct rules 
regarding the notifying the disposing authority of being 
classified as a prisoner on remand posing a serious social 
threat or serious threat to the safety of the correctional 
facility, notifying the disposing authority of a continuing 
health treatment at the correctional facility after the 
release, as well as the consent specified in Article 141a, 
and in other cases if the need to secure the proper 
conduct of criminal proceedings so merits – where the 
provisions of the Law on Enforcement of Criminal 
Sanctions concerning prisoners on remand apply. 
Moreover, § 2 of the provision quoted above excludes the 
possibility of such prisoners on remand being granted 
prison furloughs, awards involving temporary leave 
permits to be absent from prison, as well as leave permits 
to be absent from prison during the period of transition 
from custody to community. On the whole, the 
construction of this provision is difficult to accept. The 
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legislator granted this group of detainees the same rights 
as those of convicted prisoners, yet established an 
extremely wide range of exceptions to them. Various 
authors have argued in the literature that the exceptions 
to this principle are so numerous that they in fact wholly 
cancel it [14]. While simultaneous application of a 
preventive measure to convicted prisoners must entail 
certain restrictions, it may nevertheless be preferable to 
grant them the same rights as those conferred upon 
prisoners on remand. 
 
The analysis presented above must lead to the 
conclusion that restrictions applicable to individuals 
being held in pre-trial detention are more stringent than 
those applicable to convicted prisoners. Since prisoners 
on remand are to enjoy at least the same rights as 
convicted prisoners serving a sentence of deprivation of 
liberty under the ordinary regime in a closed correctional 
facility, the question arises as to what extent their rights 
exceed those of convicted prisoners. The analysis of the 
provisions granting better rights to prisoners on remand 
than to convicted prisoners is neither extensive, nor 
significant. Indeed, the permission to use one's own 
clothing, underwear and shoes (Article 216 § 1 of the Law 
on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions), also during 
procedural activities (Article 216a of the Law on 
Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions), or (upon consent of 
the authority at whose disposal the prisoner on remand 
remains and or the director of the detention centre) one's 
own food, medication, and personal care products (Article 
216 § 2 of the Law on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions) 
can hardly be described as having a significant impact on 
the quality of life of a person being held in pre-trial 
detention, especially since the Law on Enforcement of 
Criminal Sanctions provides for exceptions to these rules. 
 
Prisoners on remand have the right to dispose of their 
own money, valuables and other things while being 
detained, including the right to deposit money in a bank 
account, unless the authority at whose disposal a prisoner 
on remand remains decides otherwise. In this respect, 
their rights are indeed more extensive than those of 
convicted prisoners, whose possibilities in this regard are, 
limited (Article 113 of the Law on Enforcement of 
Criminal Sanctions). Nevertheless, it is worth stressing 
that the majority of prisoners on remand are actually 
unable to dispose of their own money and the disposing 
authority may deprive them of this right. 
 
The rights of prisoners on remand also appear more 
beneficial than those of convicted prisoners as regards 
disciplinary punishments. Sanctions for prisoners on 
remand do not include up to three months of visits 
organised in such a way that direct contact between the 
prisoner and the visitor is impossible. Neither do they 
include reducing part of the remuneration for work due to 
the convicted prisoner by up to 25% for up to three 
months. In other cases, they are less severe – isolation in a 
solitary confinement cell may only last up to 14 days (and 
not 28, which is the maximum length for convicted 
prisoners), whereas the ban on participation in cultural 
and educational classes or on purchasing food or tobacco 
products may not exceed one month (in case of convicted 
prisoners – 3 months). The only inexplicable 
differentiation is the possibility of suspending the awards 
and privileges granted to a convicted prisoner (prisoners 
on remand may only be entirely deprived of those). In 
essence, while the catalogue of disciplinary punishments 
is more favourable to prisoners on remand than to 
convicted prisoners, the few privileges that they enjoy do 
not in any way compensate for the numerous restrictions 
imposed on them as a result of the application of the 
preventive measure. 
 
The Duration of Pre-Trial Detention 
The analysis of the special restrictions on the rights of 
persons placed in pre-trial detention would not be 
complete without a discussion on one particularly acute 
problem of pre-trial detention, namely its duration. It 
should be emphasised that the duration of pre-trial 
detention is not strictly determined and the Polish legal 
system merely sets out what the relative maximum 
duration of pre-trial detention can be (Article 263 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure). As Zgoliński I [6] has 
pointed out, "looking at the construction of Article 263 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, one cannot help but think 
that the legislator developed the regulation concerning 
pre-trial detention by piling exceptions to a rule. These 
exceptions accumulate, thus creating exceptions to 
exceptions that precede them. And alongside this, 
gradation of the periods of pre-trial detention was 
somehow created". This means that the person placed in 
pre-trial detention does not know exactly how long they 
will be deprived of liberty – and the obligation to 
determine the duration of this preventive measure each 
time it is applied does not change significantly, as the 
period may always be extended. Therefore, all the 
aforementioned restrictions – no contact with the family, 
idleness, being unable to carry out any plans one might 
have – become temporally unforeseeable. The situation of 
a convicted person serving a valid sentence of deprivation 
of liberty is totally different – a convicted prisoner knows 
the incarceration is for a fixed term, and after a period of 
time specified by law may become eligible for a parole, or 
even earlier, for a furlough. Moreover, prolonged pre-trial 
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detention marginalises, or even nullifies other criminal 
law institutions in the broad sense of the word (e.g. 
eligibility to qualify for conditional early release in a 
situation when the remand consumed all or most of the 
penalty). 
 
The Constitutional Tribunal did not call into question 
the absence of regulations on the absolute maximum 
duration of pre-trial detention, although it did point out 
that the conditions specified in law "are difficult to 
evaluate using definite and objective 
criteria"(Constitutional Tribunal, 24 July 2006, SK 58/03, 
OTK-A 2006, no. 7, item 85). This requirement is not 
formulated in the Constitution either. Neither is it present 
in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. It is not even formulated 
by the European Court of Human Rights [20]. 
Nevertheless, the position of common courts and the 
Constitutional Tribunal is clear – the extension of pre-trial 
detention under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure is of an extraordinary nature, and so the 
conditions for doing so must be strictly interpreted [21]. 
Hence, it should be noted that court file research 
encompassing 58 cases (103 defendants) carried out in 
2009 by Momot S [22] revealed that the pre-trial 
detention lasted from 2 to 9 years; in the case of 23 of the 
defendants it exceeded 4 years; whereas in the case of 9 of 
the defendants – 5 years. Moreover, it is no secret that 
Poland lost most cases heard by the ECHR concerning the 
excessively long duration of pre-trial detention [16]. 
 
In the light of the above, it is legitimate to subscribe to 
the view held by Hofmański P and Zabłocki S [20] who 
argue it is necessary to set the absolute maximum 
duration of pre-trial detention (which may differ 
depending on the degree of gravity of the charges) at no 
more than 3-4 years, with the exception of situations 
where the accused intentionally protracts criminal 
proceedings concerning specified categories of felonies. 
Although there may be doubts as to whether it is the 
gravity of the offence – as opposed to the complexity of a 
case – that should call for an extension of pre-trial 
detention, the criterion proposed by the authors is clear 
and precise and adequately fulfils the guarantee function. 
 
The Legal Situation of Foreigners 
Detained in Poland 
The problems indicated above are exacerbated when 
the prisoner is a foreigner. The latest statistics show that 
in 2018, in Polish correctional facilities and detention 
centres there were on average 968 foreigners, which 
accounts for slightly more than 1% of all prisoners. It 
should be noted that this group is not homogeneous in 
terms of nationality and culture. Monthly statistics 
confirm that the number of foreigners – although not very 
significant – is growing steadily, also in 2019. The foreign 
population is particularly visible among prisoners on 
remand, which should not come as a surprise 
(https://www.sw.gov.pl/strona/statystyka-roczna; 
https://www.sw.gov.pl/strona/statystyka--biezaca; 
Central Database of Persons Deprived of Liberty 
Noe.NET). In the case of foreigners whose life's focus is 
outside Poland or who, despite living in Poland, have 
strong links with their country of origin, there is a greater 
risk that the accused may take flight or go into hiding, 
which is in fact one of the criteria for the application of 
the most severe preventive measure (Article 258 § 1 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure). 
 
Under the current regulations, foreigners do not 
constitute a separate category of prisoners on remand, 
and so are subject to the same formal restrictions as other 
detainees. However, these restrictions – given who they 
are applicable to – can gain a different meaning. 
 
The European Prison Rules recommend that "special 
arrangements shall be made [by member states] to meet 
the needs of prisoners who belong to ethnic or linguistic 
minorities" (Point 38.1 of the European Prison Rules). The 
Polish Prison Service is becoming increasingly aware of 
the complications that arise from a language barrier 
between the prisoner and prison staff members, and is 
organising special courses for the officers. Since the 
detainees demonstrate different linguistic competencies, 
English language courses for the officers do not solve the 
problem. There may be cases where a prisoner and the 
prison staff do not communicate in the same language, 
and access to interpreters is limited. Similar obstacles 
may arise in contacts with other detainees. In such cases, 
the regime governing contacts with the external world – 
although frequently justified by the functions of the 
preventive measure – becomes even more severe. One 
visit per month may be the only occasion for the arrested 
foreigner to talk in a language he understands. At the 
same time, it appears that the fact of having a 
conversation in a language unknown to prison officers, 
and thus the officers' inability to control the content of 
such a conversation, may constitute grounds for refusal to 
give consent to such visits under Article 217 § 1b of the 
Law on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions. Nonetheless, 
it should be mentioned that the difficulties involved in the 
proper organisation of such visits should not in 
themselves constitute grounds for refusal to grant 
consent. In the event where consent to a visit is granted, 
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another problem may be the family's arrival for the 
meeting, in particular when the prisoner's relatives do not 
live in Poland.  
 
The limited number of prison visits and the difficulties 
involved in the realisation of visits increase the 
importance of telephone contacts. Refusal to grant 
consent to the use of the telephone may completely 
eliminate the possibility of having a direct conversation 
with the closest family or others. This makes it all the 
more important for the authority at whose disposal the 
prisoner on remand remains to refuse its consent only in 
duly justified circumstances (Article 217c § 2 of the Law 
on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions). The last possible 
method of contact, namely letters, may also involve 
further complications. The problems with the prolonged 
censorship of correspondence outlined above will likely 
arise also in case it is necessary to involve a translator in 
order to control the correspondence. It should be stressed 
that the inability to communicate in the Polish language 
and lack of knowledge of the law will make certain 
restrictions even more severe and will most likely create 
difficulties in the exercise of the prisoner's rights and 
privileges. Hence, it is important that penitentiary 
facilities follow the recommendations of the European 
Prison Rules by ensuring that information on these rights 
is available in a language familiar to the prisoner (Points 
37.4 and 38.3 of the European Prison Rules), even though 
the Polish law does not provide for such a requirement.  
 
Another issue to be addressed arises from cultural 
differences not related to language. Regardless of whether 
a prisoner is a competent speaker of the Polish language 
or not, he may encounter problems in the exercise of his 
religious practices, customs, and food practices. Clearly, 
this problem also affects Polish citizens who may have 
less popular preferences in this respect. Even where 
applicable laws provide for certain general rights and 
liberty guarantees, there are limitations of a factual 
nature, such as the unavailability of a minister 
representing a given denomination, or the lack of access 
to specific grocery products. Given the above, situations 
where such restrictions are intentional are even more 
difficult to handle. Examples may include lack of consent 
for the detainee to use food received from outside the 
detention centre, e.g. kosher food, or wear his own 
clothing, e.g. a turban or hijab (Article 216 § 1 and 2 of the 
Law on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions). While the 
fear of the prisoner escaping, combined with reasons of 
security may justify the refusal to grant consent in such 
cases, the religious connotations attached to such needs 
will make the restrictions extremely painful.  
 
At the conclusion of the section devoted to pre-trial 
detention of foreigners, it is worth noting that the fact 
that a prisoner is a representative of a different culture 
may compound adaptation difficulties. Communication 
problems, different looks, clothes, eating habits, etc. may 
lead to the isolation of a detainee from the prison 
community. In this situation, being placed in a multi-
person cell, where merely 3 square metres are 
guaranteed per inmate, may be particularly difficult for 
foreign prisoners. The ban on the use of the computer 
may prove equally burdensome for foreign detainees.  
 
Whereas pre-trial detention of foreigners is often fully 
justified and necessary, one must bear in mind that also 
his group of prisoners benefits from the presumption of 
innocence. Any and all restrictions and the resultant 
hardships may only be applied when they are necessary 
for the achievement of the objectives of the preventive 
measure. The situation of foreign prisoners may become 
yet another impulse for reconsidering the legitimacy of 
imposing certain restrictions on prisoners on remand.  
 
Conclusion 
The final conclusions that follow from the analysis 
conducted herein must be preceded by invoking some of 
the most important directives laid down in the 
Recommendation Rec (2006) 13 on the use of remand in 
custody, the conditions in which it takes place and the 
provision of safeguards against abuse. First of all, the 
Committee of Ministers in the preamble stressed that pre-
trial detention may cause irreversible damage to persons 
ultimately found innocent, and that it may have a 
detrimental impact on the maintenance of family 
relationships. For this reason, a stipulation was made in 
directive 5 that prisoners on remand shall be treated in a 
way appropriate to their legal status, which entails the 
absence of restrictions other than those necessary for the 
administration of justice, the security of the institution, 
the safety of prisoners and staff and the protection of the 
rights of others, and in particular the fulfilment of the 
requirements of the European Prison Rules. The 
recommendation does not require that the total 
maximum period of pre-trial detention be specified 
mentioning only that it should be proportionate to the 
penalty that may be imposed, that the case should be tried 
in a reasonable time, and that priority should be given to 
cases involving a person being held in pre-trial detention 
(recommendation 22-24). At the same time, the EPR 
recommend that there should be no restrictions as to the 
number of letters sent and received by prisoners on 
remand (recommendation 38), and that remand in 
custody should not unduly disrupt the education of 
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children and young persons or unduly interfere with 
access to more advanced education.  
 
It appears that many of the currently applicable 
restrictions ought to be eliminated altogether, and those 
that must remain (e.g. restricted contacts) should be 
listed, while the conditions for their use should be 
specified with great precision, allowing for a judicial 
review of the merits of their use. In conclusion, a separate 
status, a mode of application of pre-trial detention, 
instead of the mechanically invoked closed correctional 
facility regime, must be created. It cannot be denied that 
pre-trial detention is related to procedure and not 
enforcement of criminal sanctions, thus, the grounds for 
its application and also all restrictions (especially the 
facultative ones) need to have procedural, and not 
penitentiary objectives. Furthermore, it appears essential 
that the absolute maximum duration of pre-trial detention 
should be introduced [7,20]. The justification for such a 
limit on its duration would be similar to one of the 
arguments advanced in favour of using the limitation 
period – the risk of inefficiency and incompetence of the 
law enforcement authorities and the judiciary is borne by 
the state and not by the accused (regretfully, sometimes 
that entails consequences for the injured party). The final 
postulate concerns the practice of making decisions 
regarding various rights granted to prisoners on remand 
upon consent of the prosecution service or court. It 
appears that the only grounds and justification for the 
application of particular restrictions are specified in the 
criminal proceedings. Therefore, if the court decided to 
apply pre-trial detention due to the fear that the accused 
may go into hiding, no restrictions should apply to the 
accused person's correspondence, as it cannot be said 
that the detainee’s correspondence could facilitate his 
going into hiding. In this context, it is necessary to 
remember that the ECHR has pointed out on numerous 
occasions that the state's financial condition cannot justify 
worse treatment of persons deprived of liberty. In the 
opinion of the Court, penitentiary policy must be carried 
out taking into account the financial capability of the 
state, and not at the expense of the rights of prisoners. 
Hence, it is our view that the rights of prisoners on 
remand should be as extensive as possible, regardless of 
the resultant costs [23].  
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